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Introduction 
The definition of a comprehensive community 
initiative (CCI) is, depending on one’s viewpoint, 
maddeningly imprecise or wonderfully flexible. 
CCIs are described as an approach to addressing 
social problems, generally described in terms of 
a set of common characteristics (Kubisch, Weiss, 
Schorr, & Connell, 1995; Rich, Emrey, & West, 
1999; Austin & Lemon, 2005). Sharing several key 
tenets, CCIs are 
collaborative in their governance and strategies;•	
holistic, encompassing a broad range of policy •	
concerns, even as they may initially focus on a 
single problem; 
engaged in long-term, strategic community-•	
building efforts; 
focused on building social capital, leadership, •	
and community capacity (Fulbright-Anderson 
& Auspos, 2006; Kubisch et al., 1997). 
CCIs have addressed mental health concerns 
(Emshoff et al., 2007; Holden, Friedman, & San-
tiago, 2001), employment for low-income people 
(Silver, 2004), neighborhood improvement 
(Foster-Fishman et al., 2006), and coordina-
Key Points
· This article describes the trade-offs between the 
city-level and neighborhood-based approaches in 
examining the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s 
(RWJF’s) Urban Health Initiative (UHI), an $80 mil-
lion, 10-year effort to improve the health and safety 
of young people.
· Eight cities engaged in a two-year planning pro-
cess; five received funding for an eight-year imple-
mentation phase. Plans that engaged in bottom-up 
activities, but left power and control in the hands of 
civic, business, social service, and political leaders, 
were favored. Those who had focused exclusively 
on neighborhood-based approaches were not 
funded for implementation.
· RWJF chose a city-level focus because they be-
lieved neighborhood-level initiatives lacked the politi-
cal clout to make sustainable changes in programs, 
institutions, systems, and policies. Furthermore, 
poor outcomes for children were not concentrated 
in a few neighborhoods, but were found in a sub-
stantial portion of the city’s communities. 
· The UHI sites were successful in bringing existing 
efforts quickly under their umbrella, strengthening 
them by bringing added resources, data, techni-
cal expertise, and visibility. With citywide focus 
and leadership, the power between the initiative 
and local philanthropy was made more balanced. 
However, the fragmented nature of government 
service delivery systems at the city level created 
new obstacles to change in some cases.
· The UHI’s citywide focus meant that some of the 
important roles that neighborhood comprehensive 
community initiatives have assumed went unfilled. 
For instance, attention devoted during planning 
to cultural norms and values that might influence 
health and safety outcomes quickly ebbed during 
implementation.
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tion of social services (Procello & Nelson, 2002; 
Meister and De Zapien, 2005; Kreger, Brindis, 
Manuel, & Sassoubre, 2007). The emphasis of 
CCIs has been largely at a subjurisdictional, typi-
cally neighborhood, level. Fewer have intervened 
citywide.
Yet, in 1996, for its Urban Health Initiative (UHI), 
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) 
funded collaborative efforts in distressed US cities 
to improve the health and safety of their young 
people citywide. Well over 1 million children and 
youth stood to benefit. Eight cities were funded 
for two years of planning; five cities — Baltimore, 
Md.; Detroit, Mich.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Oakland, 
Calif.; and Richmond, Va. — received funds for 
eight years of implementation. UHI embraced the 
core tenets of CCIs, involving political, philan-
thropic, business, and nonprofit leadership (e.g., 
the civic elite) in the participating cities to create 
changes in systems affecting children and youth 
citywide. 
To realize their vision, the RWJF invested ap-
proximately $80 million in UHI. These monies 
were directed to the sites but were also used to 
fund the National Program Office (NPO), the 
national evaluation of the initiative, a National 
Advisory Committee, and a seminar series on 
relevant research. The NPO brought the site 
leadership together several times a year during 
the planning process, then once a year thereaf-
ter. They oversaw and monitored the progress 
of each of the sites through regular visits and 
phone calls and hired a variety of experts to 
provide technical assistance to the sites over 
the course of the initiative. In addition, they 
organized an annual visit to a non-UHI city and 
brought as many as 20 staff members and city 
leaders from each site. Many of these city leaders 
were invited to become UHI fellows and began 
attending annual UHI meetings. UHI fellows 
were enlisted to contribute their expertise and 
leadership to site activities.
In addition, the national evaluation team, based at 
New York University, provided technical assis-
tance to help the sites use data and manage their 
local evaluation efforts. RWJF also funded a semi-
annual two-day seminar convened by William 
Julius Wilson at Harvard University; the seminar 
brought together site directors with prominent 
scholars in the fields of economics, sociology, psy-
chology, education, and health to feed research 
into practice in the field. 
In this paper, we analyze the impact of choos-
ing a citywide focus over a neighborhood one. 
We begin with RWJF’s rationale for choosing to 
intervene at the city level. Next, we examine how 
that decision influenced the planning process in 
the UHI cities. We discuss how the citywide focus 
shaped the roles assumed by the sites in imple-
menting their plans, and the activities undertak-
en. We demonstrate that the decision to intervene 
at the city level provided increased opportunity 
to build political power and create meaningful 
changes in public and private systems. However, 
it also impeded the kind of community building 
more typically associated with CCIs and surfaced 
a different set of challenges to improving the lives 
of children and youth.
Data and Methods
This paper makes use of data collected for UHI’s 
national evaluation, which has been described 
elsewhere (Weitzman, Silver, & Dillman, 2002). 
We reviewed information collected during annual 
site visits and key informant interviews (con-
ducted every 18 months) and analyzed site docu-
ments. We also drew on our work in producing 
and revising the UHI Theory of Change (abbrevi-
The decision to intervene at the 
city level provided increased 
opportunity to build political power 
and create meaningful changes in 
public and private systems. It also 
impeded the kind of community 
building more typically associated 
with CCI's.
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ated in Weitzman et al., 2002), as well as on other 
conversations with staff of the RWJF and its NPO. 
What Was the Rationale for Using a 
Citywide Approach?
A growing body of literature examines the ways in 
which low-income neighborhoods further impov-
erish low-income people residing in them (e.g., 
Wilson, 1987; Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, Klebanov, 
& Sealand, 1993). Such research has led policy-
makers, practitioners, and researchers to renew 
efforts to improve neighborhood conditions. 
Some have argued that the neighborhood may be 
a more manageable unit for intervention and fo-
cus (Fishman & Phillips, 1993) than city systems, 
which had been the focus of earlier antipoverty 
efforts such as Model Cities.
New Futures, funded by the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation in 1988 to reform the funding and 
delivery of services to high-risk youth in midsize 
cities, illustrated some of the dilemmas of work-
ing at a city level. According to the foundation’s 
own reflective report, The Path of Most Resis-
tance, numerous obstacles blocked the reform-
ing of city services, especially the lure for local 
participants of “expanding good programs rather 
than challenging fundamental arrangements and 
attitudes and seeking basic reforms” (Annie E. 
Casey Foundation, 1995, p. 15). The foundation’s 
experience with New Futures and several other 
initiatives led them back to the neighborhood, 
where they focused on building the capacities of 
local residents and neighborhoods to more read-
ily participate in systems reform in subsequent 
initiatives such as Rebuilding Communities and 
Making Connections.
RWJF went in a different direction, rejecting the 
neighborhood focus in favor of a citywide one. 
This was based both on their own interpreta-
tion of the problems that were faced by New 
Futures and their experience with their own 
community-based substance-abuse initiative, 
Fighting Back (Lindholm, Ryan, Kadushin, Saxe, 
& Brodsky, 2004). RWJF believed that neighbor-
hood efforts, even those that worked with city 
government, such as the Hewlett Foundation’s 
Neighborhood Improvement Initiative (Brown 
& Fiester, 2007) or the Edna McConnell Clark 
Foundation’s Neighborhood Partners Initiative 
(Chaskin, 2000), lacked the political clout to 
make sustainable changes in programs, institu-
tions, systems, and policies that affect the lives 
of low-income communities (Jellinek, 2008). 
Further, RWJF was interested in working in 
economically distressed cities, where poor out-
comes for children were not concentrated in a 
few neighborhoods but were found in a substan-
tial portion of the city’s communities. For RWJF, 
improving the life of distressed urban communi-
ties required the investment of the political and 
civic leadership of a city, alongside that of local 
residents.
To reach such a scale, RWJF designed UHI to 
make it as attractive to citywide leaders as pos-
sible. The foundation chose its target population 
with the belief that children and youth had the 
best chance of garnering the widest breadth of 
support (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 
1994). Charles Royer, Seattle’s former mayor, was 
selected to head the NPO, with the expectation 
that his political experience and knowledge of 
city government would benefit the initiative. Like 
other CCIs, each site was allowed to choose their 
own outcomes and strategies. However, RWJF’s 
rationale for embracing this nonprescriptive tenet 
was different. A prescriptive program, they rea-
soned, would not attract senior policymakers or 
civic leaders, dooming the effort to get “to scale” 
(Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1994). Allow-
ing city leaders to shape the character of the effort 
would broaden its appeal.
How Did UHI’s Planning at the City Level 
Differ From Planning at the Community 
Level?
RWJF embraced a top-down and bottom-up ap-
proach to planning (Silver, Weitzman, & Brecher, 
2002). They aimed to use the planning process 
to identify community priorities and to mobilize 
political will among both the political elite and 
the citizenry to address them. As noted, many 
CCIs, though working with city leaders, have 
placed greater emphasis on building the capaci-
ties of residents (generally from poorer communi-
ties) to participate in reform efforts. UHI placed 
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greater emphasis on cultivating engagement 
among policymakers and civic leaders and far 
less time than other CCIs working with residents. 
RWJF encouraged the sites to create structures to 
bring the civic elite to the table where decisions 
about resources and direction would be made. As 
expected by RWJF, mayors and other key leaders 
participated in foundation site visits and related 
activities. 
The emphasis on city leadership was reflected in 
the stewardship of the UHI sites throughout the 
planning phase. In Oakland, responsibilities were 
shared by the mayor’s office, the county executive, 
and a large community foundation. In Richmond 
the Chamber of Commerce, suburban county of-
ficials, and several citywide nonprofit institutions 
convened the effort. In Philadelphia, commis-
sioners from youth-serving agencies oversaw the 
development of the plan. 
CCIs use the experience of neighborhood resi-
dents — in their interactions with one another 
and with community institutions — to develop 
an agenda for change (Chaskin, 2000; Brown, 
Butler, & Hamilton, 2001). They have engaged 
community leaders, neighborhood service 
providers, local religious groups, funders, and 
government representatives in assessing com-
munity assets, inventorying problems, and 
investigating relevant community norms and 
values (Foster-Fishman et al., 2006). “Hard” data 
has been used less frequently in CCIs because 
they are less available at the neighborhood level 
and require substantial expertise to manipulate 
(Coulton & Hollister, 1998). UHI’s city-level ap-
proach required the sites to emphasize such data 
to persuade and educate city political and civic 
leaders, as well as gather additional data from 
community residents. 
Using data, the UHI sites identified which 
neighborhoods had the greatest concentration of 
problems for children and youth. But they were 
cautioned that they should not focus attention on 
just one or two neighborhoods, unless the magni-
tude of the problems in these neighborhoods was 
large enough to affect citywide outcomes. Further, 
RWJF advised the sites that while problems 
might be concentrated within neighborhoods, 
solutions were likely found at the city level. As a 
result, while the UHI sites engaged in bottom-up 
planning activities that echoed the work of more 
traditional CCIs, community “voice” played a 
relatively small role in this initiative. As one city 
commissioner noted, “In truth, we had a profes-
sional planning process, with a little community 
input.”
Only in Baltimore did the community organizing 
activities result in the “community” having direct 
power over the final agenda; 7,000 community 
residents gathered at a children’s summit to vote 
on the priorities for the UHI effort. For the site 
director and her staff, turning the final decision 
over to community residents was a political strat-
egy, aimed at ensuring a constituent base that was 
visible, powerful, organized, and citywide. 
Grasping the Meaning of “Scale”
In the end, plans that engaged in bottom-up ac-
tivities but left power and control in the hands of 
civic, business, social service, and political leaders 
were favored. Those who had focused exclusively 
on neighborhood-based approaches were not 
funded for implementation. Even the five cities 
funded to go forward were asked for substantial 
revisions to their plans, which were deemed too 
unfocused and too bottom-up to make change at 
a citywide scale (Silver et al, 2002).
Prior to CCIs, efforts to involve neighborhoods 
in city decision making generally did not change 
how decisions were ultimately made (Chaskin & 
Abunimah, 1999). Some CCIs have envisioned 
a reorientation of decision making through 
partnerships between city government and 
community residents to restructure how local 
government services are delivered. (Hess, 1999; 
Chaskin & Abunimah, 1999). In practice, and 
with few exceptions (notably the Youth Futures 
Authority in Savannah, Ga.), many of the policy 
changes sought by CCIs have been of a relatively 
small scale, requiring little fundamental change 
in government’s relationship with communi-
ties (Chaskin & Abunimah, 1999; Kaufman et 
al., 2006). Though CCIs have sought to improve 
social and health service delivery within the target 
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neighborhoods, transforming such systems for 
better delivery in other communities has generally 
not been their goal. RWJF envisioned citywide 
systems change as UHI’s role.
To be sure, the real meaning of “getting to scale” 
was as elusive to RWJF and the NPO as it was to 
the sites. In rewriting their plans, the sites were 
asked how many children their strategies would 
need to reach to “move the needle” in citywide in-
dicators of health and safety; this became known 
as the “denominator exercise” (Jellinek, 2008). If, 
for instance, a site proposed expanding after-
school participation in order to reduce violence 
and teen pregnancy, the denominator exercise 
required data regarding existing after-school 
slots, rates of participation, and expected impact. 
Yet information and data needed to meaningfully 
make such calculations were often unavailable. As 
a thought experiment, the “denominator exer-
cise” focused attention on the idea of scale, but 
as a planning tool, it produced very crude guess 
estimates of what it would take to see measurable 
changes at the city level. 
Moving planning from a neighborhood to city-
wide focus resulted in the selection of proposed 
solutions that required policy change at a level 
beyond the neighborhood. In order to make the 
needed changes in policy, the sites cultivated 
their relationships with the civic elite, even at 
the expense of their relationships with neigh-
borhood groups. In implementation, top-down 
dominated.
How Did UHI’s Citywide Emphasis Shape 
the Character and Roles the Sites Took On? 
Similar to the experience of some neighborhood-
based CCIs, most UHI entities set up indepen-
dent organizations with larger staffs. Each had a 
board chaired by a well-recognized city leader. In 
Richmond, for instance, the incoming vice-chair 
of the Chamber of Commerce led the board for 
Youth Matters, the local UHI site. Such leadership 
reinforced the coalescing of power in these orga-
nizations. It also preserved a focus on changing 
systems at the city level, and further encouraged 
the UHI sites to assume a different set of roles 
than typical of neighborhood CCIs.
The Big Tent: Coalescing Existing Efforts
With a citywide focus and involvement of city 
leadership, the UHI sites were able to gather 
other existing initiatives into their tent. For 
example, as federal funding for Healthy Start 
ended, the UHI sites in Baltimore and Phila-
delphia absorbed their activities. In Richmond 
and Baltimore, the United Way’s Success by Six 
became a key component of the UHI effort. Oak-
land’s Safe Passages assumed responsibility for 
the oversight of the city’s designated tax to fund 
youth-serving organizations. Detroit’s initiative 
picked up a focus on safe neighborhoods from its 
lead agency’s previous efforts. The integration of 
existing efforts into UHI reduced competition for 
funds and provided the opportunity to “rational-
ize” existing services. The UHI sites strengthened 
pre-existing efforts by bringing added resources, 
data, technical expertise, and visibility. They of-
fered the opportunity to take such programs “to 
scale,” forcefully tackling city and state systems 
that regulated and funded many of them. As a se-
nior staffer involved in one such pre-existing ef-
fort noted, “We know how to write good grants, 
and get funding that way. But we have no idea 
how to get government agencies to make sure 
that funding for our program will be there – even 
though it’s a really good program. That’s [UHI’s] 
job … and nobody else is doing that.”
In contrast, evaluations of neighborhood-based 
initiatives suggest a focus on coordinating activi-
ties among neighborhood groups and programs 
(Chaskin, 2000; Meyer, Blacke, Caine, & Williams 
Pryor, 2002; Chaskin & Peters, 2000), rather than 
a reorganization of policy and funding streams 
that support them. Further, some coordination 
efforts have been stymied by turf disputes and 
The sites were asked how many 
children their strategies would  
need to reach to “move the needle”  
in citywide indicators of health  
and safety.
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historic mistrust among neighborhood groups 
(Brown et al., 2001; Chaskin, 2000 Sridharan, Go, 
Zinzow, Gray, Gutierrez Barrett, 2007). Though 
the UHI sites were not immune from turf battles, 
their mandate to operate within the citywide 
power structure allowed them to be seen, by 
some, as necessary and inescapable allies rather 
than competitors. One city health commissioner 
noted, “I think there is a lot of support from the 
community on children’s issues, but a systems 
problem has been in getting people to be collab-
orative instead of competitive. UHI is letting us 
tell people to put some old business aside.”
Philanthropy’s Role
With UHI’s citywide focus and leadership, the 
power between the initiative and local philanthro-
py was made more balanced. As with community-
based efforts, the UHI sites received substantial 
support from local foundations, which have been 
urged to “invest” in and “partner” with their 
communities (Brown & Fiester, 2007). Indeed, 
in many UHI sites, local community and family 
foundations structured their giving to support 
the agenda established through the UHI process. 
Yet with UHI, local philanthropic financial sup-
port was less important than its civic clout. As 
one UHI senior staffer noted, “In some ways, our 
foundations were important more as civic lead-
ers, than as funders. We knew the mayor would 
return their calls.” In turn, local philanthropy saw 
the UHI as a way to “shake loose” the dollars in 
public systems. One local foundation president 
noted, “We know it’s time to draw in leadership 
from the public sector. We can’t do it on our dol-
lars alone.” 
Engaging Political Leaders
To change city policies, the UHI sites became 
“players” in the cities’ political life. Each of the 
sites used mayoral races as opportunities to 
increase the visibility of the problems facing chil-
dren and youth. In Detroit, UHI’s Youth Connec-
tion (later, Mayor’s Time) held forums for mayoral 
candidates to discuss children’s issues; the winner 
ran on a platform that publicly adopted the 
Youth Connection agenda as his own. Baltimore 
Safe and Sound challenged mayoral candidates 
to endorse its goals for children and youth; the 
site’s executive director subsequently advised the 
incoming administration’s transition team. Sites 
helped to educate the voters about referenda and 
other electoral issues. Oakland’s Safe Passages 
developed materials to educate the public about 
local and state referenda on funding for services 
for youth. 
With their neighborhood focus, CCIs have rarely 
had — and have rarely sought — the clout needed 
to attract mayoral candidates to their agenda. 
They have established relationships with city 
government to advocate for specific policies, but 
have not seen their relationship with city hall 
as a principal determinant of their success. Top 
policymakers need not be involved in creat-
ing small grant opportunities, revitalizing block 
associations, gaining access to a local school, 
or providing programming in a neighborhood 
playground. The UHI sites made it a priority to 
gain political access and clout in order to change 
public systems. In Detroit, for example, the UHI 
site negotiated a policy change with the school 
district that allowed community groups access to 
all school buildings throughout the city.
Filling Holes in City Government
Over time, the sites came to resemble local think 
tanks, with an emphasis on solving problems 
of implementation. They analyzed data, inves-
tigated problems of service providers, provided 
technical assistance, dissected budgets, incubat-
ed programs, and evaluated and monitored new 
“I think there is a lot of support 
from the community on children’s 
issues, but a systems problem 
has been in getting people to 
be collaborative instead of 
competitive. UHI is letting us tell 
people to put some old business 
aside.”
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models of delivering services. Data and policy 
analysts were added to their teams. This work, 
unusual for a CCI, was used by city government 
officials who, after repeated budget cuts, lacked 
staff to do it internally (Weitzman, Silver, Brazill, 
2006). A deputy city manager in one UHI site 
explained, “I don’t have anyone on staff who can 
do these things — look at data, figure out what 
else is out there, understand the money. There’s 
no one left with those skills at this level of gov-
ernment.”
The Roles Not Taken
The UHI’s citywide focus meant that some of the 
important roles that neighborhood CCIs have 
assumed went unfilled. For instance, attention 
devoted during planning to cultural norms and 
values that might influence health and safety out-
comes quickly ebbed during implementation. The 
value placed on engaging city leaders, and looking 
at public funding and policies, relegated concerns 
about such norms to the back burner and moved 
the sites away from the community’s perspective. 
As one possible consequence, several sites over-
estimated the number of new after-school slots 
they could readily fill, because they failed to take 
into account parental preferences (Weitzman, 
Mijanovich, Silver, Brazill, 2008). 
Many CCIs have mobilized community resi-
dents to get involved in improving neighborhood 
conditions (Hess, 1999). These activities, which 
CCIs link to building social capital (Kubisch et al., 
1997), were rare in UHI’s implementation phase. 
Mapping community assets, undertaken in three 
sites during planning, was abandoned as the sites 
moved to changing public systems from the top. 
Town meetings and other community forums 
vanished early in implementation. Religious 
organizations played little role in the governance 
and direction of the UHI sites, even as they have 
been critical to neighborhood CCIs. In contrast 
to many CCIs, the majority of UHI sites did not 
regard the building of neighborhood leadership 
as a goal. After eight years of the UHI, one city 
policymaker noted regretfully, “Our constituency 
has really been inside government and service 
providers. We don’t have any real relationship to 
the community.”
To a large extent, the UHI sites’ relationships 
to neighborhoods were a result of a top-down 
approach, in which neighborhood engagement 
was limited to specific strategies, only to be 
abandoned when these strategies were dropped. 
Efforts in Baltimore and Philadelphia to use com-
munity engagement to reduce youth violence are 
illustrative of this problem. Despite evidence of 
success in another city (Braga, Kennedy, War-
ing, Piehl, 2001) and locally, mayors in both cities 
were wary of the neighborhood activism compo-
nent of this approach. With their cities’ high-
profile crime rates, the mayors chose traditional 
methods of law enforcement that provided them 
with more direct control. Given the mayors’ op-
position, the strategy of community engagement 
to address youth violence was abandoned. With-
out leadership in the neighborhoods to mobilize 
in favor of such strategies, top-down trumped 
bottom-up.
The UHI experience suggests that a city-level fo-
cus is not incompatible with a focus on neighbor-
hoods. The relationship to participating neighbor-
hoods is, however, different from the partnerships 
typical of neighborhood-based CCIs, in part 
because there are too many distressed neigh-
borhoods in distressed cities. Building so many 
neighborhood CCIs wasn’t feasible. Instead, the 
UHI sites typically focused on policy interven-
tions at the city level, while improving the imple-
mentation of programs at the neighborhood level. 
With this orientation, they sought out citywide 
nonprofit providers, such as the Boys and Girls 
Club, which had multiple sites throughout the 
city. Still, the reach of such organizations was 
limited: some did not work within the neighbor-
hoods most in need, while others had followed, 
at least in part, their constituencies out to the 
suburbs. These citywide providers sometimes 
sought to pull resources to other of their loca-
tions, even as they were outside areas of greatest 
need. The UHI sites found that they needed to 
negotiate relationships with community-based or-
ganizations (CBOs) and providers serving single 
neighborhoods. As these groups were inevitably 
battling against each other for resources, working 
with neighborhood groups was difficult as well. 
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How Did the Citywide Focus Shape the 
Strategies and Activities Within the Sites? 
Despite the nonprescriptive nature of the 
initiative, the sites selected similar strategies: 
expanding and improving the quality of after-
school opportunities, reducing violence affecting 
youth, providing services to high-risk families 
with young children, and ensuring early reading 
achievement. While neighborhood CCIs have 
undertaken similar strategies (Local Investment 
Commission, 2002; Meyer et al., 2002; Chaskin, 
2000), UHI’s citywide focus led them into the guts 
of city and state government and away from the 
neighborhoods. 
Improving Service Delivery in the City
Like other CCIs, the UHI sites embraced coor-
dination of public systems at the neighborhood 
level, but pursued it in a more traditional top-
down approach to devolution by co-locating ser-
vices and helping them function better (Chaskin 
& Abunimah, 1999; Silver, 2004). For instance, 
rather than working with neighborhood case-
workers to develop referral systems, Philadelphia 
Safe and Sound supported the development and 
implementation of an electronic records system 
to provide caseworkers across agencies immedi-
ate access to documentation about the services 
families were receiving.
Coordinating public services proved more 
important to some arenas than others, since the 
sites were wading into areas, such as after-school 
services, where systems do not exist. CCIs can 
circumvent this problem within a single neigh-
borhood by connecting a CBO and a school, find-
ing philanthropic and city funding, and cobbling 
together a new program or two. However, at the 
city level, linking agencies was more cumber-
some, funding streams were more fragmented 
and confusing, and issues of facilities and capacity 
were daunting. Rather than coordinate services, 
the UHI sites found themselves trying to create a 
system, or at least citywide policies, to rationalize 
activities. For example, Oakland’s Safe Passages 
blended TANF monies, school truancy funds, and 
behavioral health dollars to fund school coordina-
tors to link young people to an array of services 
inside and outside the school building. 
With UHI’s emphasis on public systems and city-
wide services, improving government efficiency, 
rarely a goal of CCIs, became central. In Philadel-
phia, an annual Children’s Report Card charted 
the city’s performance in regard to multiple 
health and safety outcomes and government ser-
vices. In Baltimore, Safe and Sound worked with 
the local human services coordinating body to 
build their capacity to target funding and improve 
the quality of services delivered. Despite the slow 
pace of incremental reform, the UHI sites saw no 
way around changing public systems from within 
if they were to achieve their goals.
Working With State Government
The sites’ work at the city level gave them access 
and visibility at the state level as well; the ne-
cessity of such access had been originally un-
derestimated by RWJF. State government has a 
great deal of control over the human service and 
educational systems affecting citywide outcomes 
for children and youth (Brecher, Searcy, Silver, 
Weitzman, 2004). Thus, the UHI sites needed to 
work with state government and agencies, further 
pulling it away from neighborhood engagement. 
The site director for Richmond’s Youth Matters 
was asked to chair the statewide task force on 
educational reform. The site director for Detroit’s 
Mayor’s Time was asked to chair the statewide 
task force on expanding after-school opportuni-
ties. Most significantly, the Baltimore site con-
vinced the governor’s office to sign a “compact” 
allowing the city to keep and reinvest monies 
saved through effective prevention strategies. 
What Are the Challenges Created by 
Working at the City Level?
Dancing With Elected Officials
UHI’s experience in fielding a citywide CCI offers 
some cautionary lessons, especially in regard to 
leadership. First, from its earliest stages, UHI 
forged strong relations to mayors, helping the 
sites gain access to other civic leaders. Yet close 
relations with a current mayor meant the sites 
had to struggle to navigate mayoral change. Being 
too closely identified with an outgoing mayor is 
problematic, while being too outside the mayor’s 
priorities could make the site irrelevant. Strong 
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and lasting buy-in from philanthropic and busi-
ness leaders helped to ease mayoral transitions 
in some sites, since every mayor needed such 
support. Greater emphasis on developing citizen 
constituents, e.g., troops on the ground, helped 
one site through a mayoral transition; it might 
have benefitted the others.
Negotiating Levels of Government
Second, the public sector is far more fragmented 
than was initially acknowledged in the UHI 
approach. With an emphasis on citywide out-
comes, the UHI sites quickly came to focus on 
city government. Yet, the sites also contended 
with independent school boards, county govern-
ment, and state government in their efforts. The 
governmental systems that touch the lives of chil-
dren and youth are complex and involve multiple 
jurisdictions and funding streams. More attention 
to the role of state government as funders and 
regulators of services and greater appreciation for 
the independence of school districts might have 
enabled the UHI sites to move their strategies 
along more quickly.
Third, some public systems are more amenable 
to multisector approaches than others. The 
public health and social service systems, accus-
tomed to contracting with community providers, 
proved easier to engage in reform efforts than did 
criminal justice or school systems. One county 
supervisor remarked, “Our schools are mired in 
a defensive posture and I don’t see that changing 
soon.” High crime and dropout rates placed both 
of these systems under intense scrutiny; this may 
have deterred them from engaging in what they 
viewed as experimental approaches. Furthermore, 
leadership in these scrutinized systems changed 
frequently — school superintendents and police 
chiefs came and went — making meaningful 
engagement even more difficult.
Getting to Scale Isn’t Program Replication  
Writ Large
The UHI sites learned that there is no formula for 
turning promising programs into citywide prac-
tice. Some CCIs have succeeded in implementing 
innovative programs in after-school services, in-
terventions with high-risk families, or alternatives 
to incarceration. But the literature is thin when 
it comes to the question of scale. Addressing 
problems “at scale” went beyond program replica-
tion; the sites had to deliver technical assistance, 
reform funding mechanisms, improve program 
monitoring, develop a trained workforce, build or 
revitalize infrastructure, and create demand for 
such reforms. Accomplishing each step requires 
myriad skills and knowledge, and support for 
them was insufficient. Further, scale required 
rationalizing services across the city; it sometimes 
required the closing of underused facilities and 
institutions in some of the city’s poorest and most 
depopulated areas. Given the long-held and in-
tense racial divides that continue to plague these 
cities, such decisions were particularly fraught. 
Engaging Civic Leadership in Declining Cities
Neighborhood CCIs have viewed the building of lo-
cal leadership as integral to their approach. In some 
sense, UHI presumed a deep bench of civic elite 
that could be mobilized to steer the reform. In these 
declining cities, that bench turned out to be thinner 
than expected. Many large businesses and non-
profits had decamped along with affluent residents. 
Further, even once civic leaders were engaged, UHI 
sites had to work to retain their interest. The NPO’s 
Fellows Program nurtured this leadership, and site 
directors uniformly praised this work.
Conclusion
UHI demonstrated that multisector collaboration 
at the city level can garner sufficient political clout 
to make meaningful changes in policies, programs, 
and institutions serving children and youth. While 
borrowing from and building on the neighbor-
hood CCI model, UHI evolved into an initiative 
that was far more political, focusing on citywide 
Greater emphasis on developing 
citizen constituents, e.g., troops on 
the ground, helped one site through 
a mayoral transition; it might have 
benefitted the others.
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policies and systems, and much less that of com-
munity perspective and voice. Neighborhoods, or 
communities, exist at the subjurisdictional level; 
they do not have control over public policies or 
budgets, nor are they governed by elected leaders. 
By choosing a larger, geo-political jurisdiction as 
the focus of the UHI, RWJF encouraged the sites 
to take on a somewhat different set of roles than 
those of community CCIs and also enabled them 
to make inroads that are typically impossible at 
the community level. At the same time, a citywide 
focus left the sites scrambling with unforeseen is-
sues, such as the role of the state and a diminished 
civic elite, and grappling with the not-yet-resolved 
question of getting to scale. 
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